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I. INTRODUCTION
Cannabis1 “is America’s most valuable [cash crop], worth an estimated
$35 billion, more than hay, soybeans, and corn[,]”2 and has enormous po-
tential value not only for businesses, but also for state and federal govern-
ments via tax revenue.3 However, since 1970, the government has spent $1
trillion on the War on Drugs.4 Even though President Obama’s adminis-
tration declared the War on Drugs over in 2009,5 his drug interdiction
* Adrian Ohmer is an Associate at Invest Detroit, covering both the Detroit
Innovate and First Step Fund venture capital funds and a May 2013 graduate of the
University of Michigan Law School. He was the Volume 2 Editor-in-Chief of the Michigan
Journal of Private Equity & Venture Capital Law. This note was submitted for independent
research credit under the direction of Professor Noah D. Hall. Adrian would like to thank
Professor Hall for his guidance and comments on this note, as well as Professor Bryce C. Pilz
for his thoughts on specific parts.
1. The word “cannabis” is used throughout the note, as opposed to “marijuana” or
“pot,” because it is the scientific name for the plant. However, in order to maintain the
integrity of the sources referenced, the original wording of those sources have been pre-
served when quoted.
2. GREG CAMPBELL, POT, INC.: INSIDE MEDICAL MARIJUANA, AMERICA’S MOST
OUTLAW INDUSTRY xxiii (2012).
3. There is an argument that legalizing and taxing cannabis may not generate enough
revenue to cover greater social costs, including increased health care, lost work productivity,
crime, and other expenditures. See id. at 188. It is claimed that total illicit drug use already
accounts for $180 billion in social costs, noting that alcohol and tobacco don’t generate
enough revenue to offset their social costs. See id.
4. Id. at xxii.
5. See Gary Fields, White House Czar Calls for End to ‘War on Drugs’, WALL ST. J.
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budget request for FY 2011 was still $15.55 billion,6 a 3.5 percent increase
from FY 20107 and a (nominal) 17.1 percent increase from FY 2008.8 In-
deed, $10 billion was earmarked for law enforcement.9 Furthermore, it is
estimated that the United States spends “$13.7 billion per year enforcing
marijuana laws alone, the total price of both state and federal expendi-
tures on interdiction efforts and the cost of incarceration.”10
Despite the federal government’s stance on cannabis, and the current
and historical spending to wage the War on Drugs, recent polls and legisla-
tion suggest that sentiment among American voters has shifted in favor of
legalization.11 One of the most significant recent developments in the his-
tory of drug regulation and prohibition in the United Sates occurred on
November 6, 2012, when voters in Washington and Colorado voted to le-
galize the possession, production, and recreational use of cannabis.12 On
the same day, Connecticut and Massachusetts voted to become the 17th
and 18th states, respectively, to join the club of states that allow cannabis
for medical purposes.13 Additionally, in October 2013, California an-
nounced that it would form a panel headed by the Lieutenant Governor to
draft a possible 2016 ballot measure to legalize cannabis in the state.14 All
of these developments at the state level fly in the face of the federal gov-
ernment, which has declared cannabis to be of no medical or other legal
6. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY: FY
2011 BUDGET SUMMARY 15 (2010) [hereinafter FY2011 BUDGET STRATEGY], available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ondcp/policy-and-research/fy11budget.pdf.
7. Id.
8. See EXEC. OFFICE OF PRESIDENT, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY: FY 2010
BUDGET SUMMARY 13 (2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
ondcp/policy-and-research/fy10budget.pdf. Of note, however, is that the drug control budget
in both 2008 and 2011 is lower—in nominal and real terms—than in 2000. See OFFICE OF
NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY: FY 2001 BUDGET
SUMMARY 2 (2000), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/ondcppubs/publications/policy/
budget00/budget2000.pdf (estimating the FY 2000 drug control budget at $18.45 billion
($24.29 billion in 2012 dollars)).
9. FY2011 BUDGET STRATEGY, supra note 6, at 15.
10. See CAMPBELL, supra note 2, at 109.
11. See, e.g., CNN Poll: Support for Legal Marijuana Soaring, CNN (Jan. 6, 2014, 8:00
PM), http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2014/01/06/cnn-poll-support-for-legal-marijuana-
soaring/.
12. Ella Peterson, Marijuana Legalization: Colorado and Washington State Grapple
with Implementing New Laws, POLICYMIC (Jan. 10, 2013) http://www.policymic.com/articles/
22459/marijuana-legalization-colorado-and-washington-state-grapple-with-implementing-
new-laws.
13. See infra note 46.
14. See Eliza Gray, New Laws Chart Course for Marijuana Legalization, TIME
(Oct. 19, 2013), http://nation.time.com/2013/10/19/new-laws-chart-course-for-marijuana-
legalization/; Joe Garofoli, Newsom, ACLU Look to Legalize Marijuana, S.F. CHRON. (Oct.
17, 2013, 11:21 PM), http://www.sfgate.com/politics/joegarofoli/article/Newsom-ACLU-look-
to-legalize-marijuana-4904985.php.
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use and placed the crop on the most restrictive list of illegal substances,
accompanied by drugs like heroin and MDMA.15
This note’s focus is on the future of investing in the growing legalized
cannabis industry. In Part II, it will provide a brief history of federal and
state regulation of cannabis. Part III will discuss the current role of the
federal government in regulating the cannabis industry. Part IV will ex-
plore the current avenues of access to capital for the cannabis industry.
Lastly, Part V will provide suggestions for the federal government and
state governments to reduce investment risk that exists in the cannabis
industry.
II. BRIEF HISTORY OF REGULATING CANNABIS
While the history of drug policy is well-documented and researched, a
brief discussion is necessary here, given the country’s complex and highly
political history of cannabis regulation. The idea of regulating cannabis
was first introduced in the United States via the 1937 Marihuana Tax
Act.16 The Act did not seek to make cannabis illegal, only to “burden
anyone hoping to touch it with an onerous tax and a complicated system of
requirements that made it so difficult to comply that it was effectively
banned . . . .”17 It easily became law after now-incredible testimony and
evidence was produced during congressional hearings at the direction of
Harry J. Anslinger, who was the Commissioner of the Federal Narcotics
Bureau from 1930-1961 (a predecessor to the Drug Enforcement Adminis-
tration), after having served as a federal assistant Prohibition
commissioner.18
While a corporate conspiracy theory is often cited as the reason why
cannabis was first brought under federal regulation, a more plausible cata-
lyst for regulating cannabis is simply racism.19 Steven Wishnia explains,
“[f]rom the 19th-century campaigns against opium and alcohol to the
crack panic of the 1980s, they have all been fueled by racism and cultural
war, conflated with fear of crime and occasionally abetted by well-inten-
tioned reform impulses.”20 Opium and cocaine regulation, via the Harri-
son Narcotics Act of 1914,21 can be traced to anti-Chinese and anti-black
sentiments in the United States, whereas prohibition “found momentum in
anti-immigrant sentiments aimed at Poles, Jews, Germans, Irish, and
Italians in the urban centers and blacks in the south.”22 Richard Nixon
15. 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2012).
16. CAMPBELL, supra note 2, at 51.
17. Id. at 57.
18. See id. at 51-58; see also Steven Wishnia, Debunking the Hemp Conspiracy Theory,
ALTERNET (Feb. 20, 2008), http://www.alternet.org/story/77339/debunking_the_hemp_conspi
racy_theory.
19. CAMPBELL, supra note 2, at 59-60; see also Wishnia, supra note 18.
20. Wishnia, supra note 18.
21. Harrison Acts, ch. 1, 38 Stat. 785 (1914).
22. CAMPBELL, supra note 2, at 62.
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elevated the fear of cannabis and drugs more generally throughout his ad-
ministration. The secret tape recorders in the Oval Office captured Nixon
once saying:
An awful lot of nations have been destroyed by drugs . . . I have seen the
countries of Asia and the Middle East, portions of Latin America, and I have
seen what drugs have done to those countries. Everybody knows what it’s
done to the Chinese, the Indians are hopeless anyway, the Burmese. They
have different forms of drugs . . . Why the hell are those Communists so hard
on drugs? Well, why they’re so hard on drugs is because they love to booze. I
mean, the Russians, they drink pretty good. But they don’t allow any drugs.
And look at the north countries. The Swedes drink too much, the Finns drink
too much, the British have always been heavy boozers and . . . the Irish of
course the most. But on the other hand, they survive as strong races . . . And
your drug societies inevitably come apart.23
Nixon’s goal to not let the United States become a “drug society” that
would “inevitably come apart” was accomplished (legislatively, at least)
when Congress passed the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act in 197024 (“the Act”). The Act includes the Controlled Sub-
stances Act (CSA) (Title II), which sets up the scheduling classifications.25
All controlled substances are placed into one of five schedules on the basis
of “their potential for abuse, accepted medical use, and a lack of accepted
safety,” with Schedule I controlled substances deemed to have the highest
potential for abuse, no accredited medical use, and a lack of accepted
safety, decreasing down to Schedule V.26 Cannabis is classified as a Sched-
ule I narcotic, along with heroin, GHB, MDMA, LSD, and other hard
drugs.27
By including pot in this dubious crowd, the U.S. government sent a clear mes-
sage to a nation of potheads at a time when the White House was feeling
besieged by them: Marijuana is sinister and evil with no redeeming qualities
whatsoever. Those who use it run the risk of becoming hopelessly hooked,
reduced to scrapping ashtrays for loose shake or wayward resin as they chase
a high that threatens to lead them to worse substances. Putting a drug in the
Schedule I classification is like putting an inmate in the high-security solitary-
confinement wing of the federal penitentiary, a place to sock away from soci-
ety the most incorrigible creatures humankind or nature has cursed us with.
From the federal government’s point of view, cocaine and opium are less
harmful than marijuana—they are Schedule II drugs, defined as having “a
currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States.”28
The Act also set up an administrative process to add, delete, or change
the schedule of a drug, which can be initiated by the Drug Enforcement
23. Id. at 64-65.
24. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
513, 84 Stat. 1236 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971 (2012)).
25. 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2012).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. CAMPBELL, supra note 2, at 65.
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Agency (DEA), the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS),
or by petition from any interested party.29 In May 1972, the National Or-
ganization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) and other groups
submitted a petition to the DEA to remove cannabis from Schedule I and
free the crop of all controls entirely, or to transfer it from Schedule I to
Schedule V, where it would be subject to only minimal controls.30 On Sep-
tember 6, 1988, after 16 years of administrative law hearings, federal court
hearings, and negotiations between the DEA and the various pro-cannabis
groups,31 Administrative Law Judge Francis L. Young issued a decision on
administrative rulemaking, pursuant to the Administrative Procedure
Act.32 He ruled on the principal issue of “whether the marijuana plant,
considered as a whole, may lawfully be transferred from Schedule I to
Schedule II of the schedules established by the Controlled Substances
Act” and on two subsidiary issues, “[w]hether the marijuana plant has a
currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States, or a cur-
rently accepted medical use with severe restrictions” and “[w]hether there
is a lack of accepted safety for use of the marijuana plant under medical
supervision.”33 Young analyzed the medical use of cannabis in chemother-
apy, glaucoma, multiple sclerosis, spasticity, and hyperparathyroidism in
great depth. Regarding chemotherapy, Young made 38 findings of fact and
noted that the medical community broadly accepted medical use of
marijuana:
From the foregoing uncontroverted facts it is clear beyond any question that
many people find marijuana to have, in the words of the Act, an “accepted
medical use in treatment in the United States” in effecting relief for cancer
patients. Oncologists, physicians treating cancer patients, accept this. Other
medical practitioners and researchers accept this. Medical faculty professors
accept it. Nurses performing hands-on patient care accept it. Patients accept
it.34
Indeed, Young concluded:
The overwhelming preponderance of the evidence in this record establishes
that marijuana has a currently accepted medical use in treatment in the
United States for nausea and vomiting resulting from chemotherapy treat-
ments in some cancer patients. To conclude otherwise, on this record, would
be unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious.35
Regarding multiple sclerosis, spasticity, and hyperparathyroidism, Young
made 50 findings of fact and a determination that, as with chemotherapy,
29. 21 U.S.C. § 814.
30. Marijuana Rescheduling Petition, Dep’t of Justice, Drug Enforcement Admin.,
No. 86-22 (Sep. 6, 1988) [hereinafter Marijuana Rescheduling Petition] (opinion and recom-
mended ruling of administrative law judge).
31. Id. at 6.
32. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 5 U.S.C.).
33. Marijuana Rescheduling Petition, supra note 30, at 7.
34. Id. at 26.
35. Id. at 34.
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it would be unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious to find against its ac-
cepted medial use.36 With respect to glaucoma, however, Young did not
find sufficient evidence of the same weight.37
Young also analyzed the safety of cannabis, using aspirin, a commonly
used over-the-counter product, as a basis for comparison. He found that
twenty times the recommended dose of aspirin may cause lethal reaction
and will almost certainly cause gross injury to the digestive system;38 in
fact, aspirin causes hundreds of deaths each year.39 Contrasted against as-
pirin is cannabis, for which Young found “no record in the extensive medi-
cal literature describing a proven, documented cannabis-induced
fatality[,]”40 and, in order to induce death from cannabis, a smoker “would
theoretically have to consume nearly 1,500 pounds of marijuana within
about fifteen minutes to induce a lethal response.”41 He went on to ana-
lyze the lethal and toxic qualities of then-approved medicines for cancer
and the side effects from these drugs as compared to cannabis, concluding
that “the provisions of the Act permit and require the transfer of mari-
juana from Schedule I to Schedule II.”42 Ultimately, the power to move
cannabis from Schedule I to Schedule II was in the hands of DEA Admin-
istrator John C. Lawn, who instead chose to overrule the Administrative
Law Judge’s decision.43 Lawn’s decision and the analytical framework
used, which his successor affirmed on remand,44 was ultimately affirmed
by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in 1994, when the court denied the
private parties’ petition for review.45
While cannabis remains illegal at the federal level, states have acted as
progressive laboratories regarding cannabis regulation. Currently, 18
states have legalized cannabis for medical purposes, including (in chrono-
logical order): California (1996); Oregon (1998); Alaska (1998); Washing-
ton (1998); Maine (1999); Hawaii (2000); Colorado (2000); Nevada (2000);
Vermont (2004); Montana (2004); Rhode Island (2006); New Mexico
(2007); Michigan (2008); Arizona (2010); New Jersey (2010); Delaware
36. Id. at 54.
37. Id. at 38.
38. Id. at 58.
39. Marijuana Rescheduling Petition, supra note 30, at 57.
40. Id. at 56.
41. Id. at 57.
42. Id. at 67.
43. See Marijuana Scheduling Petition; Denial of Petition, 54 Fed. Reg. 53,767, 53,783
(Dep’t of Justice, Drug Enforcement Admin., Dec. 29, 1989) (“The Administrator rejects the
administrative law judge’s findings and conclusions. They were erroneous; they were not
based upon credible evidence; nor were they based upon evidence in the record as a whole.
Therefore, in this case, they carry no weight and do not represent the position of the agency
or its Administrator.”).
44. See Marijuana Scheduling Petition; Denial of Petition; Remand, 57 Fed. Reg.
10,499, 10,507-08 (Dep’t of Justice, Drug Enforcement Admin., Mar. 26, 1992).
45. Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 15 F.3d 1131,
1137 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
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(2011); Connecticut (2012); and, Massachusetts (2012).46 Although voters
originally approved a medical cannabis program in 1998,47 the District of
Columbia (D.C.) did not pass its own medical cannabis law until 2010, the
12-year delay stemming from Congress’ attachment of riders to the D.C.
appropriations act48 that blocked the act from taking effect until 2010.49
Once effective, D.C. drafted legislation to create a medical cannabis pro-
gram, which the mayor signed into law. After a 30-day Congressional re-
view period, during which neither the Senate nor the House acted to stop
the law, the program was established.50
All of these states have removed state-level criminal penalties for the
cultivation, possession, and use of cannabis, where a medical doctor has
recommended such use; moreover, all have instituted programs to regulate
the use of medical cannabis by approved patients.51 Physicians in those
states are immune from liability and prosecution for discussions or recom-
mendations of medical cannabis to their patients, and patients may be as-
sisted by caregivers (except in New Mexico and New Jersey), who are
authorized to help patients grow, acquire, and use cannabis.52 Regarding
the then 14—now 18—states with medical cannabis programs, Mark Eddy
explains:
Effective state medical marijuana laws do not attempt to overturn or other-
wise violate federal laws that prohibit doctors from writing prescriptions for
marijuana and pharmacies from distributing it. In the 14 states with medical
marijuana programs, doctors do not actually prescribe marijuana, doctors rec-
ommend marijuana to their patients, and the cannabis products are grown by
patients or their caregivers, or they are obtained from cooperatives or other
alternative dispensaries. The state medical marijuana programs do, however,
46. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5; OR. REV. STAT. §§ 475.300-.375;
ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 17.37.010; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 69.51A.005 - .903; ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2383-B; HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 329-121 to -128; COLO. CONST. art. 18, § 14;
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 453A.010 - .810; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 4472-41; MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 50-46-101 to -344; R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 21-28.6-1 to -13; N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 26-
2B-1 to -7; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 333.26421-.26430; ARIZONA REV. STAT. §§ 36-
2801–36-2819; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:6I-l; 16 DEL. C. CH. 49A; CONN. H.B. 5389 (draft regula-
tions released on Jan. 16, 2013); MASS. BALLOT QUESTION 3. Additionally, Maryland allows
for a medical necessity defense for people who use cannabis on their own for medical pur-
poses, but does not have a medical cannabis program. MD. CRIM. CODE ANN. §5-601; see also
MARK EDDY, CONG. RESEARCH. SERV. RL33211, MEDICAL MARIJUANA: REVIEW AND
ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL AND STATE POLICIES 23 (2010)).
47. See Election Results, Initiative Measure #59, D.C. BD. OF ELECTIONS AND ETHICS,
http://www.dcboee.org/election_info/election_results/elec_1998/ini59_98.htm (last updated
Sept. 20, 1999).
48. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-117, 123 Stat. 3034
(2009).
49. D.C. CODE § 7-1671 (see miscellaneous notes); see also EDDY, supra note 46, at 24-
25.
50. 20 Legal Medical Marijuana States and DC, PROCON.ORG, http://medicalmarijuana
.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000881 (last updated Dec. 13, 2013).
51. EDDY, supra note 46, at 18.
52. Id.
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contravene the federal prohibition of marijuana. Medical marijuana patients,
their caregivers, and other marijuana providers can, therefore, be arrested by
federal law enforcement agents, and they can be prosecuted under federal
law.53
On November 6, 2012, however, two states went even further than the
state medical cannabis programs discussed above. Voters in Colorado and
Washington approved ballot initiatives that:
not only made it lawful for adults to use and possess up to an ounce of mari-
juana—for any purpose, not just medical—but also ordered state regulators to
begin licensing commercial businesses to engage in for-profit cultivation and
distribution of the drug, much as those regulators currently do with tobacco
and alcohol.54
The initiatives in both states framed their efforts through the lens of mak-
ing the most efficient use of law enforcement resources, public health and
safety, and generating new tax revenue for the state.55
III. ROLE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
Before discussing the role of the private sector in and financing of the
cannabis industry, it is important to understand the role of the federal gov-
ernment in this burgeoning industry. Constitutionally, it would seem that
those state laws that allow for a cannabis industry to exist (whether for
medical or recreational purposes) would be pre-empted by federal law
banning such allowance due to the Supremacy Clause.56 However, it has
not been as simple in practice, “[leading] to a seemingly incongruous situa-
tion in which both the federal criminal prohibition on marijuana and state
medical marijuana exemptions coexist.”57 As discussed in Part II, the Con-
trolled Substances Act is the federal law that categorizes all drugs (via
schedules) and has outlawed the use of cannabis.58 Furthermore, in 2005,
the United States Supreme Court upheld Congress’s power to prohibit
even purely intrastate cultivation and possession of marijuana.59 But sig-
nificant questions were left open for those in states where cannabis had
been legalized under state law. To aid United States attorneys with such
questions, Deputy Attorney General David W. Ogden released a memo-
53. Id. at 19.
54. Roger Parloff, Yes We Cannabis, FORTUNE, Apr. 8, 2013, at 68.
55. In Colorado, the initiative was known as Amendment 64: The Regulate Marijuana
Like Alcohol Act of 2012, available at http://www.regulatemarijuana.org/s/regulate-marijuana
-alcohol-act-2012. In Washington, the initiative was known as Initiative Measure No. 502,
available at http://sos.wa.gov/_assets/elections/initiatives/i502.pdf.
56. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“The Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”).
57. TODD GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH. SERV. R42398, MEDICAL MARIJUANA: THE
SUPREMACY CLAUSE, FEDERALISM, AND THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL
LAWS 1 (2012).
58. See supra text accompanying notes 24-28.
59. GARVEY, supra note 57, at 5 (citing Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005)).
Fall 2013] Investing in Cannabis 105
randum in October 2009.60 In that memorandum, Ogden attempted to
clarify that the pursuit of illegal drug manufacturing and trafficking
(namely, Mexican cartel operations) “should not focus federal resources
. . . on individuals whose actions are in clear and unambiguous compliance
with existing state laws providing for the medical use of marijuana.”61
While that seemingly took care of the conflict between federal and state
laws (in that, if one was in compliance with state law, then there existed no
federal priority to enforce), the Ogden Memorandum was also clear that
the federal government would continue to investigate and prosecute com-
mercial enterprises in the cannabis industry and that “claims of compli-
ance with state or local law may mask operations inconsistent with the
terms, conditions, or purposes of those laws, and federal law enforcement
should not be deterred by such assertions . . . .”62
Due to incomplete readings of the Ogden Memorandum, there was a
significant increase in commercial cultivation, sale, distribution, and use of
cannabis for purported medical purposes.63 The Department of Justice
was forced to clarify the Ogden Memorandum in June 2011, when Deputy
Attorney General Juan M. Cole released another memo clarifying that it is
within Congress’s power to prohibit the production, possession, and distri-
bution of marijuana and within the federal government’s power to exercise
that authority, through the Department of Justice and the DEA. The
memo reads, in part:
The Ogden Memorandum was never intended to shield such activities from
federal enforcement action and prosecution, even where those activities pur-
port to comply with state law. Persons who are in the business of cultivating,
selling or distributing marijuana, and those who knowingly facilitate such ac-
tivities, are in violation of the Controlled Substances Act regardless of state
law. Consistent with resource constraints and the discretion you may exercise
in your district, such persons are subject to federal enforcement action, includ-
ing potential prosecution. State laws and ordinances are not a defense to civil
or criminal enforcement of federal law with respect to such conduct, including
enforcement of the CSA. Those who engage in transactions involving the pro-
ceeds of such activity may also be in violation of federal money laundering
statutes and other federal financial laws.64
Though the federal government is prohibited under the Constitution from
commandeering state legislatures or state executive officials by mandating
60. Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice,




63. GARVEY, supra note 57, at 3.
64. Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, for
all U.S. Att’ys, Guidance Regarding the Ogden Memo in Jurisdictions Seeking to Authorize
Marijuana for Medical Use (June 29, 2011) [hereinafter Cole Memo], available at http://www.
justice.gov/oip/docs/dag-guidance-2011-for-medical-marijuana-use.pdf.
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that states enact legislation or implement or enforce federal law,65 Con-
gress can persuade states to follow federal policy by conditioning the re-
ceipt of federal funds upon state enactment of certain legislation.66
The power of the federal government with respect to the burgeoning
cannabis industry is not limited to the courts, the Department of Justice,
and the DEA. Other pertinent areas of the federal government are the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS). The mission of the SEC is to “protect investors, maintain
fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation[;]”67
the mission of the IRS is to help taxpayers understand their tax responsi-
bilities and to enforce the tax laws.68
The SEC comes into play when considering investment funds seeking
investors and wishing to invest their funds in companies such as those pro-
ducing and selling cannabis. Generally speaking, investment funds may
have to file paperwork with the SEC to ensure compliance with the federal
securities laws. As part of the Dodd-Frank Act, the previously-available
private adviser exemption from registering with the SEC was eliminated,
requiring many fund advisors who were formerly exempt to then register.
The SEC has since adopted rules creating certain new exemptions, includ-
ing the Private Fund Adviser Exemption (those with less than $150 million
of assets under management),69 Venture Capital Fund Adviser Exemption
(those that only advise venture capital funds),70 and Mid-Sized Advisers
Rule (between $25 million and $100 million of assets under management
and required to register as an investment adviser in the state of principal
office).71 Likewise, any company that wishes to build a significant investor
base or access the public markets will also, absent exemptions, have to file
disclosures with the SEC.72 These disclosures to the SEC must be truthful,
65. GARVEY, supra note 57, at 7.
66. Id.
67. The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integ-
rity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, SEC. EXCH. COMM’N (Aug. 23, 2013, 4:45 PM), http://
www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml.
68. The Agency, its Mission and Statutory Authority, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., http:/
/www.irs.gov/uac/The-Agency,-its-Mission-and-Statutory-Authority (last updated Mar. 26,
2013).
69. See Exemptions for Advisers to Venture Capital Funds, Private Fund Advisers
With Less Than $150 Million in Assets Under Management, and Foreign Private Advisers, 76
Fed. Reg. 39,646, 39,666-74 (July 6, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 275).
70. See id. 39,648-66.
71. See Rules Implementing Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 76
Fed. Reg. 42,950, 42,951-54 (July 19, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275, 279); see also
Timothy Spangler, Deadline for Hedge Fund, Private Equity Fund Managers to Register with
SEC Rapidly Approaching, FORBES (Feb. 8, 2012, 3:29 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
timothyspangler/2012/02/08/deadline-for-hedge-fund-private-equity-fund-managers-to-
register-with-sec-rapidly-approaching/.
72. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12g, 15 U.S.C. § 78l (2012) (limiting compa-
nies to less than 2,000 investors, or 500 who are not accredited investors, before having to
register with the SEC, as recently amended by the JOBS Act); Exchange Act §15d, id. § 78o
Fall 2013] Investing in Cannabis 107
or else the funds and owners of the funds are exposed to the potential of
civil and/or criminal actions by the SEC.73 Perhaps due to past inability to
set up cannabis investment funds (prior to November 2012, the recrea-
tional cannabis market did not exist), the SEC has yet to issue any gui-
dance or no-action letters to such funds on which they may base their
actions.74
Investment funds and the companies in which they invest are also re-
quired, per the IRS, to declare or otherwise account for all income made
in the yearly tax collection.75 Therefore, any personal or business conduct
that affects securities or tax obligations has significant federal implications,
even if a person or business entity maintains all of its business or earnings
within one state. Unlike the SEC, the IRS has issued guidance with re-
gards to taxing medical cannabis companies and the tax benefits those
companies are permitted to take. Members of the House of Representa-
tives that represent districts where medical cannabis is legal have asked
the IRS for guidance on the tax treatment that businesses in the industry
might receive. The IRS has responded, stating:
Section 280E of the [Internal Revenue Code] disallows deductions incurred in
the trade or business of trafficking in controlled substances that federal law or
the law of any state in which the taxpayer conducts the business prohibits. For
this purpose, the term “controlled substances” has the meaning provided in
the Controlled Substances Act. Marijuana falls within the Controlled Sub-
stances Act. The United States Supreme Court has concluded that no excep-
tion in the Controlled Substances Act exists for marijuana that is medically
necessary. Because neither section 280E nor the Controlled Substances Act
makes exception for medically necessary marijuana, we lack the authority to
publish the guidance that you request. The result you seek would require the
Congress to amend either the Internal Revenue Code or the Controlled Sub-
stances Act.76
Section 280E specifically denies a tax deduction or credit for any expense
in a business consisting of trafficking in illegal drugs, thus prohibiting busi-
nesses in the cannabis industry from deducting their business expenses, as
other businesses do.77
(requiring issuers to provide supplementary and periodic information to their registration
statement); see also STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES
AND ANALYSIS 391-466 (3d ed. 2012).
73. See generally CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 72, at 168-206.
74. As of March 1, 2014, after formal checks on SEC websites and in-depth web
searches.
75. See generally INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TAX GUIDE FOR SMALL BUSINESS,
PUBL’N 334, at 11 (2012), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/p334—2012.pdf  (“You
must figure your taxable income and file an income tax return for an annual accounting
period called a tax year. Also, you must consistently use an accounting method that clearly
shows your income and expenses for the tax year.”).
76. Letter from Andrew J. Keyso, Deputy Assoc. Chief Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of the
Treasury, to Sam Farr, Congressman, U.S. House of Representatives (Dec. 16, 2010) [herein-
after Keyso Letter], available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/11-0005.pdf.
77. 26 U.S.C. § 280E (2012).
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IV. CURRENT STATE OF CANNABIS INDUSTRY: RISKS AND
ACCESS TO CAPITAL
Given the history and the restrictive role of the federal government
regarding the cannabis industry, it may seem too risky to invest in the
industry. Yet, businesses and investors are developing business plans and
building their financing sources despite the overlay of federal risk that per-
meates every aspect of the cannabis industry, and the national press is
increasingly covering these developments.78 Advances in the private sec-
tor will likely originate in those states that have decriminalized cannabis
(currently Colorado and Washington), and the developments to-date show
this to be the case. This section will analyze the risks associated with the
cannabis industry and three recent trends in the cannabis investment
space.
A. Overall Industry Risks
1. Government Action (Federal and Local)
The cannabis industry presents a significant problem to the investment
industry in a number of ways. First, the risk remains for any player in the
cannabis industry that the federal government may shut down the business
and/or impose civil or criminal liability. While some degree of risk is nor-
mally accepted and modeled by investors into their investment decisions,
these would pose significant additional risks for an investment firm to ac-
cept. The risks are increased if the business merely touches cannabis, and
is especially so if it actually possesses or distributes the substance, as the
Ogden and Cole Memoranda both make clear.79 This is due to the Racket-
eer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act of 1970 and later
expanded as part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act in 1984.80
These laws aim to deny “drug kingpins and organized crime bosses of the
spoils of their ill-gotten gains” and divide any assets collected from busts
among “the Justice Department, the Treasury Department, and the local
cops who aided in the seizure in the first place.”81 Therefore, not only may
fines and prison terms ensue from participation in the cannabis industry,
but also potentially the loss of one’s property. Police need only probable
cause to seize one’s car, cash, and even one’s home, if suspected that they
were used in the commission of a drug crime.82
Interestingly, liability may not be limited just to investors and business
owners, as “[i]t is not only individuals who possess, produce, or distribute
[cannabis] who are subject to federal sanctions, but also those who con-
78. See generally Parloff, supra note 54.
79. Ogden Memo, supra note 60; Cole Memo, supra note 64.
80. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (2012).
81. CAMPBELL, supra note 2, at 66.
82. See 18 U.S.C. § 981(b); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ASSET FORFEITURE POL-
ICY MANUAL 17 (2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/foia/docs/policy07.pdf;
CAMPBELL, supra note 2, at 66.
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spire, aid, abet, or assist in that proscribed conduct.”83 This liability may
thus extend to state actors that enable the cannabis industry as well, and
U.S. Attorneys have expressly stated as much.84 Tripp Keber, President
and CEO of Red Dice Holdings, which specializes in the edibles and elix-
irs segment of the cannabis industry, better explains:
If you lock me up, then you should head down to the marijuana enforcement
division and lock all those people up . . . [a]nd then from there, let’s go down
to the mayor’s office, because the mayor’s the one who sells me my license,
which is $15,000 a year. But then, lastly, Gov. (John) Hickenlooper, who . . .
certified the election, basically put the law into effect. So if you were going to
arrest me as a trafficker of contraband, then these are all my accessories to the
crime. And the reality is, that’s not likely to happen.85
And it may not be solely the federal government who tries to come
after these businesses: municipalities may, too, try to rid their communities
of the industry. One tactic used to accomplish this is to close businesses
that are in violation of a municipality’s land use code, which prohibits ac-
tivities that are against federal law.86 The city of Centennial, Colorado has
done just this, using the violation of a land use code as the legal basis for
shutting down medical cannabis dispensaries.87 The judge who ruled on
the suit agreed that the dispensary was in violation of both federal law and
the land use code, but held that it was not the city’s job to enforce federal
law, concluding instead that “the city of Centennial cannot use the poten-
tial violation of a federal law to order a business legally operating under
[Colorado] state constitution to cease and desist its business.”88 While this
is a win for businesses operating in the industry, there still exists significant
litigation risk, the cost of which will be borne in large part by those busi-
ness’ investors.
83. GARVEY, supra note 57, at 14 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 846, which makes it illegal to
conspire to violate the CSA); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2-4, 371.
84. Letter from Jenny A. Durkan, U.S. Att’y, W.D. Wa., and Michael C. Ormsby, U.S.
Att’y, E.D. Wa., to the Hon. Christine Gregoire, Washington State Governor (Apr. 14, 2011)
(“[W]e maintain the authority to enforce the [Controlled Substances Act] vigorously against
individuals and organizations that participate in unlawful manufacturing and distribution ac-
tivity involving marijuana, even if such activities are permitted under state law.”); see also
GARVEY, supra note 57, at 14-15.
85. Kent Bernhard, Jr., Can Private Equity and Pot Mix? Brendan Kennedy Thinks So,
UPSTART BUS. J. (Mar. 21, 2013, 10:28 AM), http://upstart.bizjournals.com/money/loot/2013/
03/21/can-private-equity-and-pot-mix.html?page=all.
86. See Verified Complaint and Application for Injunctive And Declaratory Relief at
8-16, Frasher v. City of Centennial, No. 09-cv-1456 (Colo. D. Ct., Arapahoe Cnty, Nov. 30,
2009), available at http://www.cannabistherapyinstitute.com/legal/centennial/centennial.com
plaint1.pdf; see also CAMPBELL, supra note 2, at 194.
87. CAMPBELL, supra note 2, at 194.
88. John Ingold, Judge Rules Centennial Closed Pot Shop Illegally, DENVER POST
(Dec. 30, 2009, 12:52 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/ci_14094504.
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2. Intellectual Property Protection
Federal laws also impede businesses in the cannabis industry from
building brand names for themselves and their products.89 Robert Mikos
discusses the role of trademark law in the cannabis industry, explaining:
To register a trademark, the owner must demonstrate actual use in commerce
or bona fide intent to use. The use in commerce requirement poses two
problems for [cannabis] distributors. First, courts and the Patent and Trade-
mark Office (“PTO”) have interpreted it to mean lawful use in commerce,
making it impossible to satisfy as long as marijuana distribution remains illegal
under federal law. Second, in any event, a [business] would admit to a federal
crime—in a federal court no less—by attesting to having sold marijuana in
commerce. Such an admission could expose the owner to federal crime and
civil sanctions. The PTO recently considered recognizing trademarks on me-
dicinal [cannabis], but it quickly abandoned the idea.90
Similar impediments exist for common law trademark91 and state trade-
mark registration.92
Regarding patents and copyrights, it seems that federal law may actu-
ally provide some protection for the cannabis industry. In contrast to
trademarks, in order to obtain a patent, an inventor need not currently
use, have ever used, or ever plan to use an invention to file and receive
patent protection on that invention. So long as the patent is written
broadly enough to encompass a legitimate purpose or substance, the fact
that the invention’s use is illegal does not seem to prevent it from being
patented.93 Copyright protection attaches as soon as something is reduced
to writing, drawing, or physical form; therefore, a federal copyright regis-
tration can be obtained for creative expression that relates to something
illegal, so long as the requisite actions have taken place.94
3. Access to Banking Institutions
Access to banking and the services that banks provide, while possible,
is not as readily available for members of the cannabis industry as for
others. Federal regulations do not specifically prohibit banks from having
accounts related to the cannabis industry and otherwise doing business
89. Robert A. Mikos, State Taxation of Marijuana Distribution and Other Federal
Crimes, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 223, 257 (2010).
90. Id. at n.126 (citations omitted).
91. Id. at n.127.
92. Id. at n.128.
93. See generally What Can Be Patented, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (Nov. 2011),
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/resources/general_info_concerning_patents.jsp#heading-4 (last
visited Nov. 18, 2013); see also Thomas W. Galvani, Can I Patent Something that is Used for
an Illegal Purpose?, GALVANI LEGAL (Mar. 16, 2012), http://www.galvanilegal.com/can-i-
patent-something-that-is-used-for-an-illegal-purpose.
94. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., COPYRIGHT BASICS 2 (2012), available at http://www.copy
right.gov/circs/circ01.pdf.
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with the legalized cannabis industry.95 Furthermore, Attorney General
Holder told Congress in December 2011 that the Department of Justice
would not make it a priority to pursue financial institutions that worked
with the legal medical-cannabis industry,96 despite the fact that the Cole
Memorandum included a warning that “those who engage in transactions
involving the proceeds of [the cannabis industry] may . . . be in violation of
federal money laundering statutes and other federal financial laws.”97 De-
spite these instances of relative leniency in connection with the cannabis
industry, financial institutions that are federally licensed or insured must
still comply with federal regulations. And, since cannabis is illegal under
federal law, those financial institutions refuse to hold accounts for legal
cannabis-related businesses for fear of prosecution.98 In October 2011, the
last bank in Colorado that openly worked with the medical-cannabis in-
dustry officially closed down the accounts associated with dispensaries,
forcing the industry to operate on a mostly cash-only basis.99 While oper-
ating on a cash-only basis does not prohibit a business from operating, it is
inconvenient and “makes it hard to act like a legitimate business.”100 In
Washington, medical-cannabis businesses have met the same inconve-
niences. One bank has stated that its core concern revolves around the
unknown risks in the industry and that, since the accounts associated with
the cannabis industry involve large cash deposits, such involvement neces-
sitates heightened scrutiny and reporting under federal banking and
money-laundering laws.101
Responding to many of these issues, the Department of Justice re-
leased a memorandum on February 14, 2014, regarding marijuana-related
financial crimes.102 The Department intended to make clear that, “if a fi-
nancial institution or individual offers services to a marijuana-related busi-
ness whose activities do not implicate any of the eight priority factors [in
the August 29 memo103], prosecution for these offenses may not be appro-
95. Jonathan Martin, Medical-Marijuana Dispensaries Run Into Trouble at the Bank,
SEATTLE TIMES (Apr. 29, 2012), http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2018103547_
maribanking30m.html.
96. Id.
97. Cole Memo, supra note 64.
98. STATE OF COLO. TASK FORCE REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AMENDMENT
64, REGULATION OF MARIJUANA IN COLORADO 98 (2013) [hereinafter COLO. TASK FORCE
REPORT], available at http://www.colorado.gov/cms/forms/dor-tax/A64TaskForceFinalReport
.pdf.
99. John Ingold, Last Bank Shuts Doors on Colorado Pot Dispensaries, DENVER POST
(Oct. 1, 2011), http://www.denverpost.com/news/marijuana/ci_19016660.
100. Id.
101. Martin, supra note 95.
102. Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, for
all U.S. Att’ys, Guidance Regarding Marijuana Related Financial Crimes (Feb. 14, 2014)
[hereinafter Financial Crimes Memo], available at http://www.dfi.wa.gov/banks/pdf/dept-of-
justice-memo.pdf.
103. See infra Part V.B for discussion on eight priority factors.
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priate.”104 While this guidance may be perceived by some as giving a pre-
liminary “green light” for the establishment of relationships between
banking institutions and legal cannabis businesses, the Colorado Bankers
Association believes that the guidance is actually a “red light.”105 The As-
sociation stated that the memorandum “outlined ‘all the risks involved of
banking the marijuana industry’ and ‘made it very clear that financial insti-
tutions can still face criminal liability.’”106 Indeed, the financial services
offered would still have to comply with state regulatory schemes, and the
institutions and individuals making such services available would have to
“continue to apply appropriate risk-based anti-money laundering policies,
procedures, and controls sufficient to address the risks posed by [mari-
juana-related businesses], including by conducting customer due diligence
designed to identify conduct that relates to the eight priority factors.”107
In its assessment of the recent memorandum, the Washington Bankers As-
sociation similarly noted that guidance memorandums can change at any
time and do not supersede the federal law.108
4. Tax Treatment
Lastly, cannabis-focused businesses may not be permitted to take ad-
vantage of classic business deductions on their taxes.109 Functionally this
means that those businesses that actually touch the plant are effectively
taxed on their gross revenues, as opposed to their gross profits. Of course,
only investing in those businesses that do not possess, distribute, or touch
the cannabis plant can mitigate this particular risk, but the scope of how
the IRS may interpret any illegal income gains is presently unknown and
leaves that risk both open-ended and impossible to prepare for.
B. Cannabis Investment Today
Given the risks discussed in Part IV.A, it may be hard to imagine any
capital flow into the legalized cannabis industry. Overall, funding is scarce
in this industry, particularly in light of the potential market size. Part IV.B
of this note will analyze three capital sources for the legalized cannabis
industry today.
1. Formal Fund Investing
Traditionally, developing businesses and technologies receive their first
significant infusion of financing in the form of private equity, usually pro-
104. Financial Crimes Memo, supra note 102, at 2-3.
105. Herb Weisbaum, Banks Balk on Marijuana Money Despite US Guidelines, CNBC
(Feb. 21, 2014, 8:05 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/101433431.
106. Id.
107. Financial Crimes Memo, supra note 102, at 3.
108. Id.
109. See Keyso Letter, supra note 76; see also supra Part III.
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vided by a venture capital fund.110 Venture capital funds typically take
equity stakes in startups (small and medium sized businesses) with strong
growth potential.111 The benefits of venture financing are numerous:
[They] often . . . provide the funds needed to finance research and develop-
ment and growth in multiple rounds of financing. Many . . . work closely with
young companies and can assist with formulating business strategy, recruiting
additional management talent, assembling a board of directors, . . . providing
introductions in the financial community . . . [and] mak[ing] the company
more profitable than the founders alone could have made it.112
Venture capital funds are commonly structured as limited partnerships,
where the general partner serves as the decision-maker with respect to
investments and management of portfolio companies, the venture fund
employees are housed in the management company, and the investors
(whether institutions or individuals) comprise the limited partners in the
fund.113 The advantage of this model stems from the traditional allocation
of management fees and profits, and the tax treatment of those
allocations.114
Given that this brand of private equity seeks to make strategic invest-
ments in burgeoning industries with significant return potential, it would
seem that the cannabis industry would be a promising area with a lot of
venture financing activity. However, due to the risks discussed, the financ-
ing activity is actually quite low, with only a few known funds focused in
this space.115 One such fund is Privateer Holdings, a private equity firm
whose investments are focused in the legal cannabis field and which closed
a $7 million fund in July 2013.116 In a recent Forbes article, one of Priva-
teer’s founders, Brendan Kennedy, explained that the traditional venture
capital firm route does not work (at least presently) for the cannabis in-
110. See generally CONSTANCE E. BAGLEY & CRAIG E. DAUCHY, THE ENTREPRE-
NEUR’S GUIDE TO BUSINESS LAW 458 (4th ed. 2011). The term “private equity” is used in its
broader sense, of which venture capital is a subset.
111. Venture Capital Funds, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/v/vc
fund.asp (last visited Nov. 18, 2013).
112. BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note 110, at 149.
113. See generally Asher Bearman, How VC Funds Work—Structure Chart for Venture
Capital Fund (US Fund), VENTURE ALLEY BLOG (Feb. 27, 2011), http://www.theventureal
ley.com/how-funds-work/how-vc-funds-work—-typical-fund-structure/.
114. See generally id.; see also Asher Bearman, How VC Funds Work—Expenses and
Management Fees, VENTURE ALLEY BLOG (Jan. 12, 2011), http://www.theventurealley.com/
vc-and-pe-funds/how-vc-funds-work—-expenses-and-management-fees/.
115. Ariel Schwartz, Pay Close Attention To This Marijuana Millionaire’s Weed Venture
Capital Fund, FAST CO. EXIST (Jan. 27, 2014, 9:20 AM), http://www.fastcoexist.com/3025170/
pay-close-attention-to-this-marijuana-millionaires-weed-venture-capital-fund (listing Emer-
ald Ocean Capital, the ArcView Angel Investor Network, and the High Times Growth Fund
as some of the players in the cannabis investment space).
116. Privateer Holdings—The Cannabis Industry’s First Private Equity Firm—Closes $7
Million Funding Round, WALL ST. J. MARKET WATCH (July 16, 2013, 6:00 AM), http://www.
marketwatch.com/story/privateer-holdings-the-cannabis-industrys-first-private-equity-firm-
closes-7-million-funding-round-2013-07-16.
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dustry for two reasons: first, the model leaves partners vulnerable to legal
liability; and, second, the industry lacks the kind of quality, professional
business owners that a venture fund traditionally finances and “leave[s]
alone.”117 For these reasons, Privateer structured itself as a holding com-
pany, in the vein of Berkshire Hathaway.118 In contrast to the traditional
private equity/venture capital structure, holding companies usually make
longer-term investments, as compared with the classic ten-year fund life
pervasive in the private equity and venture capital sectors.119
Current discussion about the true value of the holding company struc-
ture in the venture capital space, generally, aside,120 the most significant
takeaway, as pertains to Privateer’s structural decision, is that the firm
may have a longer investment horizon than a classic venture fund.  And,
although it is unknown if or how one structure might mitigate cannabis
industry risks better than the other, in Privateer’s case the investment ve-
hicle is sufficiently insulated, because the firm “won’t touch weed itself,
but . . . [will focus on the] market for ancillary goods and services[,]” with
an estimated market size of $10 billion a year.121 The ancillary goods and
services market alone may be divided into at least four distinct areas for
investing, including “companies marketing to the cultivator (for example,
technology for growing), companies marketing to the end consumer . . . ,
companies marketing to retailers (security, point-of-sale software), and
companies with licenses to produce and sell cannabis.”122 Even so, the
scarcity of private equity players in the cannabis market and the stigma
that cannabis currently carries, thereby disincentivizing larger funds from
investing in the market,123 renders it is hard to make any real determina-
117. J.J. Colao, Meet the Yale MBAs Trying to Tame the Marijuana Industry, FORBES
(Mar. 26, 2013, 1:23 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jjcolao/2013/03/26/meet-the-yale-mbas-
trying-to-tame-the-marijuana-industry/.
118. Id. On the Berkshire Hathaway point, some private equity managers have even
called Berkshire’s model “the perfect private equity model.” Peter Lattman, The Private Eq-
uity Parallels with Buffet, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Apr. 5, 2011, 9:06 AM), http://dealbook.
nytimes.com/2011/04/05/the-private-equity-parallels-with-buffett/.
119. See Billy Fink, Are Holding Companies the Future of Private Equity, AXIAL (Mar.
21, 2013), http://www.axial.net/blog/are-holding-companies-the-future-of-private-equity/.
120. See Ronald J. Sylvestri, Jr., Why the Standard Private Equity Fund is Losing its
Luster, FORBES (Mar. 13, 2013, 8:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2013/03/13/
why-the-standard-private-equity-fund-is-losing-its-luster/; Fink, supra note 119.
121. Wendy Kaufman, Private Equity Fund Eyes The Business of Pot, NPR (Aug. 1,
2013, 4:54 PM), http://www.npr.org/2013/08/01/207899209/private-equity-fund-eyes-the-
business-of-pot.
122. Alice Troung, The “Yelp of Weed”: Leafly and Other Marijuana Startups Hope to
Gain as Feds Ease Up on Pot, FAST CO. (Oct. 19, 2013, 8:38 AM), http://www.fastcompany.
com/3019855/the-yelp-of-weed-leafly-and-other-marijuana-startups-hope-to-gain-as-feds-
ease-up-on-pot.
123. Id. (quoting one of the largest venture capital funds, Kleiner Perkins Caulfield &
Byers, stating: “Kleiner Perkins very much cares about its brand. . . . There are tons of oppor-
tunities to make money that we don’t invest in because it doesn’t fit with our values. I can’t
imagine in the near term that we’d invest in a business that makes it money off marijuana.”)
(internal quotations omitted).
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tions about the use of a traditional legal setup as opposed to a holding
company structure.
2. Angel Investing
Another source of financing for businesses in the cannabis industry is
angel investors. Unlike private equity funds, angel investors are private
individuals who invest either debt or equity in private businesses as they
see fit for their investment profile and often do not seek active roles in the
day-to-day business operations (for example, by not insisting on board
representation or a right to approve or select key employees).124 Further-
more, individual angel investors “usually require no more than the right to
veto major changes in the business, restrictions on increases in top man-
agement’s salary, and limits on the amount of equity to be available for
incentive programs.”125 By contrast, angel networks or investor groups
typically operate much more like venture capital funds.126
One angel network that is developing in this industry is ArcView An-
gel Network.127 ArcView aims “to bridge the gap between would-be finan-
ciers of [the cannabis industry]—investors who sometimes know little
about [cannabis]—and would-be entrepreneurs in it, who sometimes know
little about finance or business.”128 Any accredited investor,129 whether
institutional or individual, who is willing to put at least $50,000 into oppor-
tunities presented by ArcView is permitted to become a member of the
network.130 ArcView itself does not invest in the businesses that it
presents to members, so, in that sense, it does not operate like a venture
capital fund, as described above.131 Instead, ArcView functions as an in-
vestment platform, as follows:
Accredited investors pay ArcView to join—currently about $3,500 per year.
(Because of snowballing interest, all fees are constantly being revised up-
ward.) ArcView culls solicitations from entrepreneurs who seek funding for
their nascent businesses. Those who make it through this prescreening can pay
for the opportunity to make a pitch at one of ArcView’s quarterly meetings.
That fee is about $1,250 to $3,000, depending on the size of the company. If
investors like what they hear, they can strike deals with the entrepreneurs
individually or jointly.132
124. BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note 110, at 147.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. THE ARCVIEW GROUP, http://arcviewgroup.com/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2013).
128. Parloff, supra note 54, at 68.
129. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a); see also Accredited Investor Definition, SEC. EXCH.
COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/answers/accred.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2013).
130. Investor Network, ARCVCIEW GROUP, http://arcviewgroup.com/investornetwork/
(last visited Nov. 10, 2013).
131. Parloff, supra note 54, at 69.
132. Id.
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According to ArcView, its investor membership includes heirs to fam-
ily money, representatives of venture capital funds, and owners of estab-
lished companies; company membership includes an LED lighting
company, an inventory management company, and a portable vaporizer
company (amongst others).133 Groups like ArcView may prove to be
more beneficial for cannabis-related business investment than traditional
fund investment, because the legal liability flows to only one investor (or a
few), as opposed to the presumably broader investor base of a fund (its
limited partners). This is likely to be especially true for those businesses
that require actual physical possession of the plant as a key component of
their business model.
3. Crowdfunding
Crowdfunding is yet another alternative cannabis businesses may con-
sider when seeking funds. Crowdfunding itself is a newer method of fi-
nancing (existing since the late 1990s).134 At its most basic level,
Crowdfunding involves “using a method of mass communication, typically
the Internet, to solicit funds from the community at large, with the project
creator receiving small individual amounts of funding from a large number
of donors or investors.”135 Until recently, all crowdfunding platforms have
been modeled as: (1) donation-based (contributors receive nothing in ex-
change for their funds); (2) rewards-based (contributors receive a token
item like a t-shirt or film credit); (3) pre-sale (contributors have option to
purchase the product in advance of its availability to the market); or (4)
peer-to-peer lending (individuals lend money directly to borrowers).136
Sites like Kickstarter, IndieGogo, and Kiva exemplify these crowdfunding
models. However, President Obama’s signing of the JOBS Act137 into law
in April 2012 unleashed another model in the crowdfunding space—equity
ownership in a startup company, by which investors may partake in the
potential upside (and downside) of that business. Prior to the passage of
the JOBS Act, there was no legal way for businesses to offer financial
interests in their companies to investors without registering those offerings
with the SEC.138
133. Investor Network, supra note 130.
134. The History of Crowdfunding, FUNDABLE, http://www.fundable.com/crowdfund
ing101/history-of-crowdfunding (last visited Feb. 25, 2014).
135. Thaya Brook Knight, Huiwen Leo, & Adrian A. Ohmer, A Very Quiet Revolution:
A Primer on Securities Crowdfunding and Title III of the JOBS Act, 2 MICH. J. OF PRIV.
EQUITY & VENTURE CAP. L. 135, 135 (2012); see also Crowdfunding, INVESTOPEDIA, http://
www.investopedia.com/terms/c/crowdfunding.asp (last visited Mar. 1, 2014); Mark Koba, You
Hear Lots About Crowdfunding, But What is it?, CNBC (Oct. 23, 2013, 2:54 PM), http://www.
cnbc.com/id/101136608.
136. Knight et al., supra note 135, at 135-36; see also C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding
and the Federal Securities Laws, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 51-67 (2012).
137. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012).
138. Knight et al., supra note 135, at 135-36.
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Crowdfunding might seem like the ideal means of financing for the
burgeoning cannabis industry to tap, since it offers the potential for mil-
lions of individuals to invest in a business. But, if a cannabis-related busi-
ness is interested in offering an equity interest in the company,
crowdfunding is not currently an ideal form of financing for two reasons.
First, under the JOBS Act, the SEC is required to promulgate rules pursu-
ant to the terms of the Act before any crowdfunding portal that offers a
financial interest may operate. The Act also requires that equity
crowdfunding portals be registered with a self-regulatory organization like
the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). While the SEC139
and FINRA140 have recently released proposed rules for crowdfunding,
the industry for equity crowdfunding is still at bay until regulators fully
implement such rules, which is not expected to take place until late spring
or early summer of 2014.141 Second, even when equity crowdfunding is
live, becoming a viable financing option, there will still be drawbacks to
crowdfunding financing stemming from the SEC’s role in regulating this
space. Companies engaged in equity crowdfunding would need to comply
with all of the rules issued by the SEC, including filing with the SEC and
providing, at a minimum, annual reports of operations and financial state-
ments to investors.142 Those companies would then be exposed to poten-
tial federal securities law liability.143 Furthermore, an equity crowdfunding
portal that facilitates these transactions would have to submit itself to an
alternative regulatory regime, subject to the SEC and an organization like
FINRA.144 These elements are likely to increase compliance costs for both
the business that uses an equity crowdfunding portal and for the equity
crowdfunding portal itself.
Currently, there is one crowdfunding platform dedicated to the canna-
bis industry—WeCanna.com.145 WeCanna presents itself as a rewards-
based crowdfunding site that facilitates the crowdfunding of “legal canna-
139. Crowdfunding, Securities Act Release No. 33-9470, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
70741, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428 (proposed Nov. 5, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200 et
seq.)
140. FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., REGULATORY NOTICE 13-34 (2013), available at
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices/p370743.pdf;
FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., REGULATORY NOTICE 12-34 (2012), available at http://
www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices/p131268.pdf; see
also Crowdfunding Portals, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., http://www.finra.org/Industry/
Issues/Crowdfunding/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2014).
141. Title III of the JOBS Act Underway: Everything You Need to Know, STARTUP VAL-
LEY (Jan. 21, 2014), www.startupvalley.com/blog/title-iii-of-the-jobs-act-underway-every
thing-you-need-to-know.htm.




144. Id. at 56.
145. As of today, it does not have any active investment opportunities. WECANNA,
http://www.wecanna.com/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2013).
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bis and hemp markets.”146 The platform also expresses an explicit desire
to enter the equity crowdfunding space once the regulatory regime is so-
lidified.147 Given the substantial regulatory oversight that will accompany
equity crowdfunding, WeCanna’s desire may prove incredibly, perhaps
prohibitively, expensive and complex.148
V. SUGGESTIONS TO REDUCE INVESTMENT RISK
A. Congressional Action
The United States Congress is in the most significant position of power
to change the risk calculations in the legalized cannabis industry. First and
foremost, it can remove cannabis altogether from the Controlled Sub-
stances Act. The Ending Federal Marijuana Prohibition Act of 2013 (H.R.
499), which was introduced and sponsored by Congressman Jared Polis of
Colorado, aims to do exactly that.149 Since the bill’s introduction on Feb-
ruary 5, 2013, it has gained 16 co-sponsors and been referred to multiple
House Committees.150 Passage of this Act would be the ideal action, as it
would direct the Attorney General to issue a final order to remove canna-
bis from all schedules of controlled substances, eliminate cannabis as a
drug in the federal criminal code, and subject cannabis to the same federal
regulations as alcohol.151 However, the bill’s chances of becoming law are
low,152 and Congressman Polis attributes this to significant pressure from
the “law enforcement industrial complex . . . [and] all those on the gravy
train of the drug war[,] which means parts of law enforcement and their
private sector vendors.”153
As an alternative to outright legalization of cannabis at the federal
level, the United States Congress could address and fix the conflicts of law
between the federal and state governments as it relates to legalized canna-
146. See WECANNA, http://wecanna.com/about-wecanna (last visited Feb. 24, 2014).
147. Id.
148. WECANNA, http://www.wecanna.com/cannabis_business_idea/ (“We hope to get
there eventually . . . .”).
149. Ending Federal Marijuana Prohibition Act of 2013, H.R. 499, 113th Cong. (2013),
available at http://beta.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/499.
150. See Committees: H.R.499—113th Congress (2013-2014), CONGRESS.GOV, http://
beta.congress.gov/bill/113th/house-bill/499/committees (last visited Oct. 27, 2013); Cospon-
sors: H.R.499—113th Congress (2013-2014), CONGRESS.GOV (last visited Oct. 27, 2013).
151. Ending Federal Marijuana Prohibition Act of 2013, H.R. 499, 113th Cong. (2013),
available at http://beta.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/499.
152. GovTrack.us estimates a 5 percent chance of getting past committee and a 0 per-
cent chance of enactment into law. H.R. 499: Ending Federal Marijuana Prohibition Act of
2013, GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr499 (last visited Feb. 25,
2014).
153. I am Congressman Jared Polis, sponsor of HR 499 to allow states to regulate mari-
juana, former entrepreneur, lead opponent of SOPA/PIPA, REDDIT (Feb. 12, 2013), http://
www.reddit.com/r/IAmA/comments/18err8/i_am_congressman_jared_polis_sponsor_of_hr_
499_to/.
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bis. The Respect State Marijuana Laws Act of 2013 (H.R. 1523),154 which
was introduced by Congressman Dana Rohrabacher of California on April
12, 2013, and has 19 co-sponsors to date,155 aims to do just that.  H.R. 1523
is a much simpler bill than H.R. 499 and merely amends the Controlled
Substances Act by adding the following:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the provision of this subchapter
related to marihuana shall not apply to any person acting in compliance with
State laws relating to the production, possession, distribution, dispensation,
administration, or delivery of marihuana.156
This amendment would have the effect of preventing the application of
federal law in those states that have chosen to legalize cannabis, whether
for medical and/or recreational purposes. The Respect State Marijuana
Laws Act of 2013 has a slightly higher chance of success than H.R. 499, but
signs still point to a low likelihood of it becoming a law.157
B. Executive Branch Action
Given the unlikelihood of congressional action on cannabis, the Execu-
tive branch could provide some clarity for the industry through a series of
executive-level actions. Since the Executive branch is the sphere of gov-
ernment concerned with executing laws, the President has the authority to
direct his government to either enforce or not enforce certain laws. First,
the President should insist that his Attorney General clarify the Depart-
ment of Justice’s legal position related to the cannabis industry in those
states where cannabis has been legalized. It is clear that the Ogden and
Cole Memoranda do not furnish sufficient comfort or knowledge as to
what may or may not run afoul of the Controlled Substances Act.
Fortunately, the Department of Justice released a memorandum on
August 29, 2013, that attempts to provide some clarity on the conflict of
laws.158 In the memorandum, Deputy Attorney General James M. Cole
first outlines the federal government’s key priorities with respect to canna-
bis, including preventing distribution to minors, revenue from the sale of
cannabis from benefitting criminal enterprises, cannabis from leaving
states where it is legal and entering states where it is not, firearm violence
related to cultivation of cannabis, drugged driving, and possession of can-
nabis on federal property (amongst others).159 The memorandum explains
154. Respect State Marijuana Law Act of 2013, H.R. 1523, 113th Cong. (2013), availa-
ble at http://beta.congress.gov/113/bills/hr1523/BILLS-113hr1523ih.pdf.
155. Cosponsors: H.R.1523—113th Congress (2013-2014), CONGRESS.GOV, http://beta.
congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/1523/cosponsors (last visited Oct. 27, 2013).
156. H.R. 1523 § 2.
157. GovTrack.us estimates an 8 percent chance of getting past committee and a 2 per-
cent chance of enactment into law. H.R. 1523: Respect State Marijuana Laws Act of 2013,
GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr1523 (last visited Feb. 25, 2014).
158. Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice to all
U.S. Att’ys (Aug. 29, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/305201382
9132756857467.pdf.
159. Id. at 1-2.
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that where state laws and regulatory schemes adequately protect (both on
paper and in practice) the federal interests outlined, and where those juris-
dictions “demonstrate the willingness to enforce their laws and regulations
in a manner that ensures they do not undermine federal enforcement pri-
orities,” then those jurisdictions are “less likely to threaten the federal pri-
orities,”160 and “enforcement of state law by state and local law
enforcement and regulatory bodies should remain the primary means of
addressing marijuana-related activity.”161 The memorandum further states
that, as federal resources should not be diverted to the regulation of medi-
cal cannabis production and use by the seriously ill and their caretakers,
neither should they be devoted to those commercial enterprises that are
properly regulated in states where cannabis is legal.162
Ideally, the Department of Justice would go one step further and issue
a memorandum echoing the sentiments of H.R. 1523, thus calling for the
federal government to defer fully to the laws of those states where canna-
bis is legal and clarifying that any other business legally and legitimately
doing business within or associated with the cannabis industry will also not
be prosecuted. Such a memorandum would have the effect of allowing
third-party service providers (e.g., financial institutions) to continue to do
business with and bring legitimacy to the industry.
The President should also direct the IRS to issue guidance allowing for
those cannabis businesses that are legal within their states of operation to
be exempt from Section 280E of the Internal Revenue Code, thereby per-
mitting tax deductions to flow to the business owners of cannabis-related
businesses. The President might also require all other agencies that have
prohibitions against businesses or individuals involved in the cannabis in-
dustry to alleviate those roadblocks in those states where the cannabis in-
dustry is legalized (e.g, allowing those prosecuted with cannabis possession
charges to be able to purchase firearms).163
Executive actions are understandably less ideal than Congressional ac-
tion due to both the patchwork nature of their implementation and the
fact that a new President can dial-back on any of these Executive Actions.
However, some reduction of investment risk is preferred to none at all,
and would represent a step in the right direction.
160. Id. at 2-3.
161. Id. at 3.
162. Id. (“[P]rosecutors should not consider the size or commercial nature of a mari-
juana operation alone as a proxy for assessing whether marijuana trafficking implicates the
Department’s enforcement priorities. . . . Rather, prosecutors should continue to review ma-
rijuana cases on a case-by-case basis and weigh all available information and evidence, in-
cluding, but not limited to, whether the operation is demonstrably in compliance with a
strong and effective state regulatory system.”).
163. See Quick Reference to Federal Firearms Laws, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, www.
justice.gov/usao/ut/documents/guncard.pdf. (last visited Nov. 18, 2013).
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C. State Action
When it comes to mitigating investment risk in the cannabis industry,
state regulatory actions will not matter as much without some movement
on the federal level. The most significant investment risks existing in the
industry are due to the federal regulatory overlay and overall lack of clar-
ity. Nonetheless, states, especially Colorado and Washington, can do a lot
to provide comfort for their own industries and a roadmap for other states,
if and when they legalize cannabis on the recreational level.
Colorado’s Task Force on the Implementation of Amendment 64 re-
leased its final report on the regulation of cannabis on March 13, 2013.164
The report contains approximately 90 pages of recommended rules and
regulations for the state to enact, and interested parties are currently pro-
viding commentary on those recommendations. One of the key proposals
in the report is for the state cannabis industry to have “common ownership
from seed to sale. This ‘Vertical Integration’ model means that cultivation,
processing and manufacturing, and retail sales must be a common enter-
prise under common ownership.”165 This recommendation, which would
be the basis for the industry’s structure, is deeply flawed, however. Attor-
ney Robert J. Corry, Jr., in his comments to the Task Force, explains:
[C]ommon ownership essentially means that a supermarket would be required
to own the apple orchards, cattle ranches, cornfields, wheat fields, orange
groves, peanut farms, tomato plants, dairies, etc., any garden or operation that
makes produce or products sold on the store shelves, the retailer must own it.
There is no other industry in Colorado nor the face of the Earth required to
comply with such an irrational and unworkable requirement as common
ownership.166
Such a common ownership structure, with its substantial barriers to
entry, would likely create monopolies or oligopolies in the cannabis indus-
try, thereby depriving small businesses of opportunities to partake in the
industry and limiting producers’ and retailers’ freedom to operate. Fur-
thermore, since the Amendment specifically provides for separate licenses
(and thus, revenue streams) for retailers, wholesalers, infused manufactur-
ers, and laboratories—the purpose of which was to help these groups de-
velop their expertise and core competencies—the vertical integration
model proposed by the Task Force may, among other things, cut potential
tax revenue for the state.167 Other problems raised with the Task Force’s
recommendations include requirements for separation of inventories for
medical and recreational use cannabis,168 different purchasing limits for
164. See COLO. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 98.
165. Id. at 7.
166. Letter from Robert J. Corry, Jr., to Chairman and Members of the Joint Select
Committee on the Implementation of Amendment 64 Task Force Recommendations, Colo-
rado General Assembly, State Capitol 9 (Mar. 20, 2013) [hereinafter Corry Letter], available
at http://www.scribd.com/doc/132229940/Rob-Corry-Amendment-64-Recommendations.
167. Id. at 11.
168. Id. at 19.
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in-state and out-of-state residents,169 excessive packaging and labeling re-
quirements,170 non-independent THC testing laboratories,171 and prohibi-
tions against mixing cannabis with other products (including nicotine and
alcohol).172 Despite its many shortcomings, the Task Force did recognize
the pervasive banking issues surrounding the cannabis industry and sug-
gested that the Colorado legislature issue a “joint resolution calling on the
federal government to take action by excepting marijuana businesses in
states with legalized marijuana industries from relevant federal regula-
tions” or fund a study to consider a way to have a financial institution that
is exempt from federal regulation.173
Other potential regulations will make Colorado an interesting case
study in cannabis industry practices. Proposition AA seeks to implement a
10 percent sales tax (on top of a statewide 2.9 percent sales tax) to cover
the costs of regulatory enforcement, as well as a 15 percent excise tax, the
proceeds of which would be allocated to public school spending.174 The
Proposition is endorsed by many prominent figures within the state and
key editorial boards across the state.175 In addition to Proposition AA,
local jurisdictions also have the ability to impose further taxation on recre-
ational cannabis, as the city of Denver is seeking to do. The result of Den-
ver’s initiative would bring the total tax bill of recreational cannabis in
Denver to 38 percent in sales taxes, plus 15 percent in excise taxes.176 Op-
ponents of these taxing levels argue that they will create “the same incen-
tive for an untaxed unregulated black market as did the original
Prohibition.”177 Proponents of such proposals argue, however, that those
tax levels are likely lower than Washington’s taxes on recreational canna-
bis.178 Despite any market infrastructure issues, sales and tax revenue
from the first month of legal cannabis sales in Colorado were significant.
169. Id. at 20.
170. Id. at 21-22.
171. Id. at 23.
172. Corry Letter, supra note 166, at 24.
173. COLO. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 98, at 98.
174. What is Prop AA?, YES ON PROP AA, http://www.yesonpropaa.com/what-is-prop-
aa/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2013).
175. See Endorsements, YES ON PROP AA, http://www.yesonpropaa.com/endorse
ments/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2013).
176. See DENVER ELECTIONS DIVISION, NOTICE OF ELECTION TO INCREASE TAXES/
DEBT ON REFERRED MEASURE AND SAMPLE BALLOT (2013), available at http://www.
denvergov.org/Portals/703/documents/Elections/VoterInfo/Docs/TABORNotice_November
2013Coordinated.pdf; see also Jacob Sullum, Will Colorado’s Pot Taxes Preserve the Black
Market?, FORBES (Oct. 10, 2013, 7:30 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jacobsullum/2013/10/
10/will-colorados-pot-taxes-preserve-the-black-market/.
177. Letter from Robert J. Corry, Jr., Treasurer, “No on Prop AA” Campaign, to Jo-
seph R. Biden, Jr., U.S. Vice President (Sept. 21, 2013), available at http://www.robcorry.com/
index.html.
178. What is Proposition AA?, YES ON PROP AA, http://www.yesonpropaa.com/what-is-
prop-aa/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2013).
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Colorado collected approximately $2 million in taxes on $14 million in re-
tail sales, with $1.4 million from the recreational cannabis tax and the rest
from the state sales tax.179 The Colorado Department of Revenue “ex-
pect[s] clear revenue patterns [to] emerge by April[, after which it can]
incorporate this data into future forecasts” to predict cannabis industry tax
revenue going forward.180
Washington’s Liquor Control Board adopted its rules for the regula-
tion of recreational cannabis on October 16, 2013, which became effective
on November 16, 2013.181 Fortunately for Washington and the state’s can-
nabis industry, the biggest flaw of the Colorado approach—the vertical
integration model—was affirmatively prohibited from inclusion in I-
502.182 Washington will issue licenses for up to 334 cannabis stores in the
state and will limit the number of licenses that any one person can hold to
three, in order to prevent monopolies.183 Under Washington’s recently en-
acted rules, growth of cannabis is permitted both indoors and outdoors,
provided compliance with specific regulations around each setting; busi-
ness financiers are required to have three months of Washington state resi-
dency and pass criminal background checks; and, medical cannabis retail
locations must be separated from recreational cannabis locations.184 In
similar fashion to the heavy cannabis taxation proposed in Colorado,
Washington’s rules implement “a 25% sales tax at three different stages:
when it’s sold from grower to processor, [from] processor to retailer, and
[from] retailer to customer.”185 Though the effect of these taxes is to in-
crease the price of a gram “from its current average of $10 closer to
$15,”186 holding both a producer and processor license permits a business
or individual to avoid the 25 percent tax at that stage.187
179. John Ingold, Colorado saw $2 million in recreational marijuana taxes in January,
DENVER POST (Mar. 10, 2014, 3:56 PM), www.denverpost.com/news/ci_25314108/colorado-
saw-2-million-recreational-marijuana-taxes-january.
180. Id.
181. WASH. STATE LIQUOR CONTROL BD., I-502 IMPLEMENTATION TIMELINE (2013),
available at http://www.liq.wa.gov/publications/Marijuana/I-502/I-502-Official_Timeline_10-
16-13.pdf.
182. Wash. State Ballot Initiative Measure No. 502 § 5 (July 8, 2011), available at http://
www.liq.wa.gov/publications/Marijuana/I-502/i502.pdf (“Neither a licensed marijuana pro-
ducer nor a licensed marijuana processor shall have a direct or indirect financial interest in a
licensed marijuana retailer.”).
183. WASH. STATE LIQUOR CONTROL BD., FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT
THE I-502 PROPOSED RULES (2013), available at http://www.liq.wa.gov/publications/Marijua
na/I-502/proposed_rules/I-502_Proposed_Rules_FAQ2_9-18-13.pdf.
184. Id.
185. Jose Pagliery, Marijuana taxes as a cash cow? Think again, CNN MONEY (May 10,
2013, 7:00 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/05/10/smallbusiness/marijuana-taxes.
186. Id.
187. See WASH. STATE LIQUOR CONTROL BD., FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS
ABOUT THE I-502 PROPOSED RULES (2013), available at http://www.liq.wa.gov/publications/
Marijuana/I-502/proposed_rules/I-502_Proposed_Rules_FAQ2_9-18-13.pdf.
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VI. CONCLUSION
This country has a complex history regarding the regulation of canna-
bis. Despite significant progressive action at the state level regarding legal-
ization of cannabis for medical and/or recreational purposes, the federal
government still hangs like a dark cloud over future progress. This cloud
has significant and stunting effects on state efforts to develop regulatory
regimes that allow businesses and investment in the cannabis industry to
thrive legally, which would increase the tax revenue into the state coffers.
Formal fund investing, angel investing, and crowdfunding could all be
promising means of financing for the cannabis industry; but, until the fed-
eral government provides some sort of comfort for investors, these meth-
ods of investing will remain constrained. Any executive or congressional
action is likely to be met with resistance by entrenched interest groups and
politicians, regardless of public support for the legalization of cannabis.
However, inroads into the industry have already been made and legal mar-
kets are being created. The federal government has a choice of whether to
continue spending significant tax dollars on futile regulatory and enforce-
ment efforts or to embrace the change that is occurring as a key partner
for the cannabis industry. Or, at the very least, by getting out of its way.
